By Nina Bachkatov
Thanksgiving has passed. President Donald Trump pardoned two turkeys rather than the traditional one, but his 28-point peace plan — which he intended President Volodymyr Zelensky to sign by the holiday — has met a barrage of criticism and accusations of capitulation to Vladimir Putin. Nonetheless, it has triggered a flurry of diplomatic activity far beyond the four parties directly involved in the search for a settlement — Kyiv, Moscow, Washington and the EU. The plan has been taken seriously further afield, as shown by offers of mediation or safe venues for talks from Turkey, Arab capitals and even Belarus.
Trump’s initiative, reworked into a 19-point document drafted jointly by Ukrainian and US officials, remains at the centre of discussions. It contains two so-called “details” left for “further talks” — an odd label given they concern core issues such as security guarantees for Ukraine and territorial questions. Whatever happens, it will not be resolved tomorrow. In the meantime, the length of the war has reshaped public attitudes, political dynamics and financial calculations. These shifts are reflected in the composition of the negotiating delegations and the distribution of responsibilities among them. Yet in the end, the decisions lie with Trump, Putin and Zelensky.
Zelensky’s dilemma
The Ukrainian president suffered a severe blow on 28 November. Already confronted with parliamentary opposition, tensions within his own party and accusations of excessive power-concentration and corruption, he then saw the man regarded as the architect of many of these policies forced to resign after his home was searched — the latest twist in a corruption scandal engulfing Zelensky’s inner circle. Andriy Yermak is far more than a trusted adviser: he is an old friend, a former shareholder in Zelensky’s television company and a companion during nearly four years of wartime isolation. The imposing figure nicknamed “the Richelieu of Kyiv” appeared in the background of almost every official visit. Having led talks in Geneva with US and European envoys, he had been expected to head the delegation hastily assembled to negotiate Trump’s plan.
He has now been replaced by Rustem Umerov, the former defence minister and, since 2025, head of the National Security and Defence Council. Umerov lacks Yermak’s authority, his ability to navigate the web of interests forged over four years of war and his capacity to shield the president. Ukraine’s wartime decentralisation — extending autonomy to agencies, the military and the intelligence services — has proved effective, far more so than Russia’s heavy centralisation. But it has also given numerous groups a taste for power, each with its own view of acceptable peace terms. The delegation that flew to Mar-a-Lago, where Trump is holidaying, left Kyiv without even knowing whom they would meet. It included two ambitious — and rival — figures: Kyrylo Budanov, head of military intelligence, and Vasyl Malyuk, head of the SBU.
Russia’s surprise
Trump appears to have caught the Kremlin off-guard. This helps explain the hesitant remarks from Dmitry Peskov, its spokesperson, who initially refused to comment on a text leaked to the media. Later he offered disjointed statements such as “I would not exaggerate its significance” and “it is a little premature” to talk of ending the war so quickly. For the most part, Russia has adopted a wait-and-see stance, casting Trump’s plan as a continuation of the August Putin–Trump summit in Alaska. The EU–Ukraine 19-point counter-proposal has been dismissed as fantasy — by Trump as well. But during a visit to Kyrgyzstan on 27 November, Putin repeated that he was ready to halt hostilities – if Kyiv agreed to withdraw from the territories it (Ukraine) currently controls. If not, he said, Russia would seize them by force.
In Moscow, this continuity of the US–Russia dialogue is seen as central to resolving the conflict. But Putin has adjusted the composition of his negotiating teams. The traditional diplomatic core — foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Putin’s foreign-policy adviser Yuri Ushakov, both former ambassadors to the UN and to Washington — has been reinforced by Kirill Dmitriev, the president’s new “negotiating weapon”. Dmitriev is a technocrat, who speaks the language of global business and is regarded as someone who can engage effectively with Trump’s business-driven approach to diplomacy. Meanwhile, routine statecraft continues: Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi is due in Moscow for the 20th round of strategic cooperation talks, and on 4–5 December Putin will travel to India.
Trump’s centrality
The US president is increasingly impatient — with Putin, with Zelensky, with his predecessor Biden, with the Europeans. But his strength lies in the fact that all are wary of provoking him. He is said to have been furious by a wave of media leaks reflecting the hostility of the intelligence agencies he had gutted, as well as divisions within Republican ranks. For Cold War veterans — the grey eminences still so present in US politics — Russia is simply the Soviet Union flying a different flag.
His team is more business-oriented than diplomatic, with the exception of secretary of state Marco Rubio, who brings foreign-policy experience. Vice-president JD Vance shares Trump’s vision for America’s future. But special envoy Steve Witkoff is a property developer, army secretary Daniel Driscoll is viewed as an amateur, and Jared Kushner — businessman and Trump’s son-in-law — also plays a role.
A divided EU
European leaders learned of Trump’s plan with dismay while attending the G20 summit in South Africa. The problem is that EU structures remain ill-suited to crisis management in wartime conditions. Even in trade matters — where the European Commission clearly leads — Brussels can find itself undercut by competing national interests when facing tariff disputes with its US ally. The war in Ukraine has exposed the bloc’s weaknesses in defence and security outside NATO. It has been forced to invent mechanisms to finance military operations. In negotiations, “Europe” is embodied by a shifting cast: the Commission and Council presidents, Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa; at times the European Parliament’s Roberta Metsola; and sometimes the EU’s diplomatic chief Kaja Kallas.
This has increased the role of ad-hoc summits convened by national leaders — often eager to distance themselves from domestic problems. None can claim to represent “Europe”, even if collectively they embody much of its economic weight and, in the case of France and the UK (the latter outside the EU), significant military capabilities including nuclear arms. Yet despite its shortcomings, it is still this “Europe” that Zelensky continues to call upon to rescue his country — as he did in Geneva and again on 1 December, when he met President Emmanuel Macron.