By Nina Bachkatov
From plans to counter-plans, last-minute mini-summits, telephone or video round tables, the salami-slicing diplomacy deployed in the search for an end to the war in Ukraine has quickly shown its limits. One problem is that it involves too many actors with divergent — sometimes contradictory — interests, many keener to appear in the picture than to contribute to a solution. Another is that it lays bare the agony of traditional diplomacy in an age of instant media exposure.
Posts on X by presidents, ministers or negotiators — before, after and sometimes during talks — leave little room for discreet testing of red lines through official or unofficial channels, allowing decision-makers to keep their cards close during well prepared meetings. Such methods still function in parts of the Arab world, where personal ties and long-standing relationships matter. Not so in the case of Ukraine, with leaks capable of torpedoing negotiations before they begin.
Trump’s card
Politico’s annual ranking struck a nerve in Europe when President Donald Trump was named the most powerful figure in European politics and policy. The judgement merely reflects reality. Today, he is the one leader few dare to contradict openly — flattered, even as others try to dilute his more extravagant proposals, mock his transactional diplomacy or quietly resist his repeated deadlines for peace in Ukraine.
Yet Trump sets the agenda while others react. Twice in two weeks he has seized centre stage: first on 22 November with a 28-point peace plan uncomfortably close to Moscow’s positions; then on 4 December with the publication of his National Security Strategy, which attacks allies more sharply than Russia or China. Trump wants the US to promote MAGA-aligned leaders in Europe — the same “patriotic forces” long portrayed as Kremlin-backed and anti-European.
In short, Trump is sidelining multilateralism in favour of transnational networks — partly because he believes them more effective, but also because they are a game he knows how to dominate.
Putin’s ambiguity
If Western leaders and Kyiv are reluctant to alienate Trump, so too is Vladimir Putin — though from a position of strength. This is reinforced by the repeated assertion from the EU and Ukraine that “only the aggressor can stop the war”, implicitly confirming that no settlement is possible without Putin’s consent.
Putin receives visitors on his own terms, travelling only to meet those he considers consequential — Trump in Alaska, or partners in China, India and Central Asia. His current posture is one of waiting: mixing maximalist demands with minimal hints of compromise, while intensifying attacks on Ukraine. It remains unclear how far he is prepared to strain Russia’s economy or test public apathy. But where eastern Ukraine and Crimea are concerned, emotional and symbolic factors can override cold calculation.
Russia, in effect, will accept a “just” peace only if it reflects realities on the battlefield — or after a crushing defeat that even its enemies do not seek. Putin is betting that Trump is in more of a hurry than he is, and that they share a mutual disdain for EU institutional structures.
Zelensky’s cards
Volodymyr Zelensky has recently shown that he still commands the politics of communication, even as his hurried visits abroad and to the front line betray the pressure he is under. He now faces the unexpected task of protecting himself not only from the Russian aggressor but also from his American ally.
Initially, threatened by Trump, he sheltered behind Europe. More recently, he has offered conditional concessions designed to be unworkable — such as elections or a referendum within 60 days, contingent on allies guaranteeing free voting in a country under bombardment, with a quarter of its population displaced or mobilised. Zelensky is willing to show flexibility, but only on Ukrainian terms, particularly regarding territory and security guarantees.
The risk is that Trump’s frustration with resistance from both Moscow and Kyiv will ultimately be directed at Ukraine. Domestically, Zelensky is weakened by corruption scandals and the resignation of Andriy Yermak, a close ally who had shielded him from personal attacks. His departure has emboldened critics — including former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba and former army commander Valeriy Zaluzhnyi — who question the conduct of the war, corruption and diplomatic missteps.
There are also questions about Zelensky’s control over military intelligence operations led by Kyrylo Budanov, whose successes in the Black Sea and against energy infrastructure risk collateral fallout — from Kazakh oil transit to Turkish sensitivities and the spillover of the conflict towards African coasts.
Europe’s search
From the outset, the EU has been directly involved in a war on its own continent. Yet its structures are ill-suited to diplomacy among 27 capitals or to military strategy. The result has been ambitious promises made before hard questions about budgets and capabilities were addressed.
Even so, Europeans have managed to insert themselves into the negotiation process. But leaders who once championed the EU as a “normative power” now operate largely in reactive mode — rushing, sometimes collectively and sometimes in ad hoc groupings, to reaffirm established positions or counter proposals from others.
The bloc must also navigate Trump’s hostility, internal divisions — with the UK keen to preserve its “special relationship” — and growing debate over a rebalanced Nato in which Europe and Ukraine would deter Russia with reduced US involvement.
The next test comes at the 18-19 December EU summit, once again dominated by Ukraine. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen may claim a modest victory after securing an agreement to freeze Russian assets indefinitely — whatever that means in a globalised economy with Russia preparing legal challenges regardless of cost and Trump having his own plan for using those assets.