Nina Bachkatov – INSIDE RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Three Caucasus, Three Balancing Acts: Between Russia, Europe and Trump’s Route

By Nina Bachkatov

The South Caucasus is often described as a single geopolitical space. On the ground, however, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are pursuing markedly different strategies—shaped by geography, recent wars, domestic politics and very different relationships with Russia, the European Union and the United States.

The contrast was visible in September, when EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Magdalena Grono, joined a 150-strong diplomatic delegation visiting Karabakh and East Zangezur, at the invitation of Azerbaijan. It was her first visit to the territories since the 2020 war. The delegation visited reconstruction projects, met local officials and former displaced residents, and saw religious and historical sites presented by Baku as sites of “Caucasian Albanian heritage”, not Armenian. Two days later, in Yerevan, Grono visited the Matenadaran, Armenia’s repository of ancient manuscripts, and stressed that the preservation of cultural heritage was an essential part of the peace process and an EU value. But she did not meet the prime minister.

EU’s Sanctions Meet a Changing World

By Nina Bachkatov

A few hours before heading off for the summer break, EU ambassadors finally agreed on the 21st package of sanctions against Russia. The negotiations were difficult, reflecting an increasingly simple reality: after more than a decade of sanctions, new targets are becoming harder to find. But European policymakers remain convinced that sanctions are steadily eroding Russia’s capacity to wage war.

The first lists, adopted in 2014, were sometimes riddled with errors, including deceased individuals and confused patronymics. Today, Brussels relies on far more sophisticated intelligence and the net has widened dramatically, targeting relatives, subsidiaries, minority shareholders and companies supplying dual-use components. Yet after twenty-one packages, agreeing on fresh measures has become increasingly contentious. Many proposals originate in Ukraine—from ntelligence services, think tanks or lobbying networks—but translating them into legally robust and politically acceptable sanctions is becoming ever more difficult.

The first problem is timing. On the very day the EU agreed to keep the price cap on Russian oil exports to $44 a barrel, global oil prices climbed to $100. Such measures inevitably lose much of their intended impact when markets move faster than policymakers.

Nato’s Russian Doll Summit

By Nina Bachkatov

A few days after the 7–8 July Nato summit, one conclusion stands out: it was not really a single event but a collection of parallel interpretations. President Trump saw it through the lens of leverage, burden-sharing and personal diplomacy; Nato general secretary Rutte and European leaders was it as an exercise in preserving transatlantic unity; president Erdogan saw an opportunity for Turkey’s defence industry and strategic influence; president Zelensky and parts of the Ukrainian security establishment saw momentum for escalation and pressure on Moscow; Russian leaders interpreted the same developments as evidence of a Western confrontation with Russia.

For weeks, Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte had worked to keep President Donald Trump on board, whatever the cost. That meant accepting the principle of raising defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP, alongside tens of billions in additional support for Ukraine. Yet Trump arrived at the summit in a combative mood. He berated Iran, criticised allies that had failed to support the US-Israeli campaign, rebuked Denmark over Greenland and Spain over its defence spending, while barely mentioning Ukraine. To underline his detachment, he declared that he had attended largely because President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would be there. Every gesture, every smile and every remark was scrutinised for its geopolitical significance.

Ukraine’s new front is Russia’s home front

By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin

For the past two weeks, Russia—a country whose wealth has long been built on oil—has been facing an unexpected and politically embarrassing crisis: a severe fuel shortage. The crisis is spreading, with more than 31 regions, including Moscow and St Petersburg, imposing restrictions on fuel sales. In Crimea, relentless Ukrainian strikes on the peninsula’s supply routes have forced the authorities to limit petrol sales to essential users. As in the other occupied territories, residents are bearing the consequences of damaged infrastructure. But Crimea is both strategically vulnerable and highly symbolic. On 26 June, after two weeks of sustained attacks, the regional governor declared a state of emergency, allowing the authorities to respond more rapidly to the situation.

Those attacks highlight the Kremlin’s growing difficulty in protecting critical infrastructure across such a vast territory. More importantly, they show that Ukraine is no longer trying simply to defeat Russian forces on the battlefield. It is trying to reshape Russia’s political and economic calculations by combining drone warfare, economic disruption and technological innovation, while using the same technologies to compensate for Ukraine’s own demographic constraints.

EU-Ukraine: Paying for the War, Missing the Talks

By Nina Bachkatov

For a brief moment, it appeared that the European Union might reconsider its near-total diplomatic freeze with Russia. Yet the discussion barely began before Brussels returned to familiar ground: a new sanctions package, continued military support for Ukraine and renewed commitments to enlargement. The contrast highlights a growing European dilemma. As the costs of war mount, the EU risks financing both Ukraine’s defence and its reconstruction while playing only a marginal role in shaping the eventual settlement.

At their meeting on 27–28 May, EU foreign ministers raised the question of whether the bloc should reconsider the diplomatic isolation imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. Yet on 8 June, the European Commission announced that it was preparing a 21st package of sanctions. The measures would target banks, cryptocurrencies and drone production, while also introducing a visa ban on all individuals who participated in the war—a historic first.

Russia’s First Wartime Duma Election

By Nina Bachkatov, with Romain Constantin

Despite commentators’ fondness for hyperbole, Russia’s parliamentary elections on September 18-20 are unlikely to generate much excitement. Barring a political earthquake, attention will focus, as usual, on turnout and on any further erosion in support for the ruling United Russia party — and what this may, or may not, reveal about the national mood after a series of unpopular measures and, above all, the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine.

More significantly, the annexed Ukrainian territories have now been fully integrated into Russia’s electoral system, with new constituencies established in these regions. In doing so, Vladimir Putin has turned a domestic election into an international issue. Ukraine and most of the international community dismissed the 2014 referendums in Crimea and Donbas as political theatre. For the Kremlin, however, the inhabitants of these territories are now Russian citizens and voters entitled to protection.

Moscow and Kyiv’s dangerous diplomacy of unilateral truces

By Nina Bachkatov

The war in Ukraine has transformed modern warfare since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. The most visible innovation has been the strategic use of drones. Less expected has been the emergence of what might be called “unilateral truces”: temporary ceasefires declared by one side without prior negotiation or agreement with the other. Rather than opening a path towards peace, these pauses have become instruments of political and information warfare. Each side seeks to corner the other, gambling that its opponent will violate the truce first and thereby reinforce competing domestic and international narratives.

The latest episode unfolded in early May. On May 4, Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced that Russian forces would observe a ceasefire on May 8-9 to mark the anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. Volodymyr Zelensky initially dismissed the proposal, arguing that no serious observer could trust Russian guarantees and that any meaningful ceasefire should be permanent rather than symbolic. Later the same day, however, Kyiv responded with a proposal of its own: a unilateral Ukrainian truce beginning on May 5.