Nato – INSIDE RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Nato’s Russian Doll Summit

By Nina Bachkatov

A few days after the 7–8 July Nato summit, one conclusion stands out: it was not really a single event but a collection of parallel interpretations. President Trump saw it through the lens of leverage, burden-sharing and personal diplomacy; Nato general secretary Rutte and European leaders was it as an exercise in preserving transatlantic unity; president Erdogan saw an opportunity for Turkey’s defence industry and strategic influence; president Zelensky and parts of the Ukrainian security establishment saw momentum for escalation and pressure on Moscow; Russian leaders interpreted the same developments as evidence of a Western confrontation with Russia.

For weeks, Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte had worked to keep President Donald Trump on board, whatever the cost. That meant accepting the principle of raising defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP, alongside tens of billions in additional support for Ukraine. Yet Trump arrived at the summit in a combative mood. He berated Iran, criticised allies that had failed to support the US-Israeli campaign, rebuked Denmark over Greenland and Spain over its defence spending, while barely mentioning Ukraine. To underline his detachment, he declared that he had attended largely because President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would be there. Every gesture, every smile and every remark was scrutinised for its geopolitical significance.

EU-Ukraine: Paying for the War, Missing the Talks

By Nina Bachkatov

For a brief moment, it appeared that the European Union might reconsider its near-total diplomatic freeze with Russia. Yet the discussion barely began before Brussels returned to familiar ground: a new sanctions package, continued military support for Ukraine and renewed commitments to enlargement. The contrast highlights a growing European dilemma. As the costs of war mount, the EU risks financing both Ukraine’s defence and its reconstruction while playing only a marginal role in shaping the eventual settlement.

At their meeting on 27–28 May, EU foreign ministers raised the question of whether the bloc should reconsider the diplomatic isolation imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. Yet on 8 June, the European Commission announced that it was preparing a 21st package of sanctions. The measures would target banks, cryptocurrencies and drone production, while also introducing a visa ban on all individuals who participated in the war—a historic first.

Ukraine War: Negotiations Under Bombs

By Nina Bachkatov

There was little to expect from the trilateral summit in Geneva beyond the fact that it took place and ended without drama. Ukraine and Russia described the meeting as “difficult” — diplomatic shorthand for an inability to move forward on the two recurring obstacles: security guarantees and territorial questions. Still, Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Rustem Umerov, and later President Volodymyr Zelensky, hinted at possible progress on the concept of a demilitarised zone. The devil will be in the detail, but at least the discussion is inching forward.

Both sides travelled to Geneva largely to signal goodwill about ending the war. Above all, however, they are anxious to keep President Donald Trump engaged — as are NATO and individual European governments. They fear that the multiplicity of crises, some of his own making, could distract Trump from Ukraine in particular and Europe more broadly.

War in Ukraine Reshaping Russia’s State System

By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin

On January 19, Russia’s presidential administration and the ruling United Russia party announced the figures who will lead the party’s campaign for the September 2026 parliamentary elections — the first national ballot since the launch of the “special military operation” in Ukraine. The five-man list includes former president Dmitry Medvedev and foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, both advocates of a hardline foreign policy; two Heroes of Russia active in patriotic youth movements; and a Hero of Labour who is a prominent war correspondent.

The move could result in veterans accounting for up to one-fifth of the 450-seat State Duma and nearly one-third of United Russia’s parliamentary group. But similar advantages were extended to veterans ahead of the 2023–24 regional and local elections, with limited success: few candidates were elected, and many faced resistance from entrenched local elites accustomed to distributing candidacies among themselves.

Pandora’s Blades: Drones Redefine Security in Europe

By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin

The use of drones has shifted from anecdotal to essential in modern warfare, largely due to the war in Ukraine. No one speaks any more of a “war of another time”, with soldiers in trenches and artillery barrages. Over the course of the conflict, drones have become indispensable on land, at sea, and in the air. They are used for everything from kamikaze strikes and aerial bombardments to delivering supplies, scattering leaflets, conducting reconnaissance, and even engaging in drone-on-drone combat. It has become an industry in its own right, as shown by the increasing number of media reports on the Ukrainian war appearing as frequently in financial pages as in international ones.

From the very first days of the conflict in February 2022, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) began to play a crucial role on the battlefield. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 gained early renown for striking Russian military equipment with remarkable precision. Its success was amplified by video footage captured by the drones themselves—images that quickly became defining visuals of the war and a powerful tool of information warfare.

Trump and Lukashenko: an unlikely tandem

By Nina Bachkatov

Thousands of ground troops and air force units took part in Zapad 2025, the large-scale military exercise held on Russian and Belarusian training grounds between 12 and 16 September. The manoeuvres came amid heightened tensions between Moscow and the West, as Russian drones crossed into Poland and Ukraine, fuelling fears that the drills might mask preparations for an assault on Ukraine’s northern borders.

Nato had only recently carried out its own exercise focused on defending the Suwałki corridor. Meanwhile, Russia’s Pacific Fleet concluded a command-post drill with submarines and coastal systems, and Nato was preparing to launch Neptune Strike in the Baltic Sea on 22 September, involving, among other vessels, the US Navy destroyer USS Bainbridge.

A Glut of Summits and a Lack of Substance

By Nina Bachkatov

If summits are a barometer of international relations, August and early September 2025 have been unusually busy. It began in Anchorage on 15 August, when President Trump warmly shook hands with President Putin—without extracting any concessions. The encounter alarmed President Zelensky, who rushed to Washington to set the record straight, backed by European allies keen to assert their weight and prevent another public humiliation of Ukraine’s leader by “Daddy Trump.” There were much flattery and thanks, but little substance.

After that, “historic summits” became a near-daily occurrence, often convened at short notice. There were duos, trios, quartets—an entire diplomatic orchestra—until President Macron called a “hybrid” summit in Paris on 4 September, with Zelensky in attendance. The self-styled “coalition of the willing” wanted to present its own plan after Trump had challenged them to do so. Hybrid in format (some leaders in person, others by video), it also mixed those with authority to deploy troops with EU officials who lacked such powers. At the last minute, they were joined by Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff.