INSIDE RUSSIA AND EURASIA – On-line Intelligence Bulletin of the European Press Agency

EU-Ukraine: Paying for the War, Missing the Talks

By Nina Bachkatov

For a brief moment, it appeared that the European Union might reconsider its near-total diplomatic freeze with Russia. Yet the discussion barely began before Brussels returned to familiar ground: a new sanctions package, continued military support for Ukraine and renewed commitments to enlargement. The contrast highlights a growing European dilemma. As the costs of war mount, the EU risks financing both Ukraine’s defence and its reconstruction while playing only a marginal role in shaping the eventual settlement.

At their meeting on 27–28 May, EU foreign ministers raised the question of whether the bloc should reconsider the diplomatic isolation imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine. Yet on 8 June, the European Commission announced that it was preparing a 21st package of sanctions. The measures would target banks, cryptocurrencies and drone production, while also introducing a visa ban on all individuals who participated in the war—a historic first.

Russia’s First Wartime Duma Election

By Nina Bachkatov, with Romain Constantin

Despite commentators’ fondness for hyperbole, Russia’s parliamentary elections on September 18-20 are unlikely to generate much excitement. Barring a political earthquake, attention will focus, as usual, on turnout and on any further erosion in support for the ruling United Russia party — and what this may, or may not, reveal about the national mood after a series of unpopular measures and, above all, the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine.

More significantly, the annexed Ukrainian territories have now been fully integrated into Russia’s electoral system, with new constituencies established in these regions. In doing so, Vladimir Putin has turned a domestic election into an international issue. Ukraine and most of the international community dismissed the 2014 referendums in Crimea and Donbas as political theatre. For the Kremlin, however, the inhabitants of these territories are now Russian citizens and voters entitled to protection.

Moscow and Kyiv’s dangerous diplomacy of unilateral truces

By Nina Bachkatov

The war in Ukraine has transformed modern warfare since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. The most visible innovation has been the strategic use of drones. Less expected has been the emergence of what might be called “unilateral truces”: temporary ceasefires declared by one side without prior negotiation or agreement with the other. Rather than opening a path towards peace, these pauses have become instruments of political and information warfare. Each side seeks to corner the other, gambling that its opponent will violate the truce first and thereby reinforce competing domestic and international narratives.

The latest episode unfolded in early May. On May 4, Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced that Russian forces would observe a ceasefire on May 8-9 to mark the anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. Volodymyr Zelensky initially dismissed the proposal, arguing that no serious observer could trust Russian guarantees and that any meaningful ceasefire should be permanent rather than symbolic. Later the same day, however, Kyiv responded with a proposal of its own: a unilateral Ukrainian truce beginning on May 5.

A War without End – And Shifting Priorities

By Nina Bachkatov, with Romain Constantin

After more than four years of death and destruction, the initial sense of urgency has given way to a degree of normalisation, with the war in Ukraine increasingly reduced to daily tallies of losses on both sides. International attention has shifted — to Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz, and economic tensions in the Asia-Pacific that could affect western economies. At the same time, EU institutions and national governments are struggling to support businesses and households from already stretched budgets.

For President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, this marks a renewed form of the feared “Ukraine fatigue”, partly alleviated by the approval of a €90bn EU loan — notably financing rather than aid. The funds will help sustain Ukraine’s war effort and Zelenskyy’s leadership. In return, Kyiv has agreed to repair damage to the Druzhba pipeline, which carries Russian oil to Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

Armenia Tests the Limits of Post-Soviet Alliances

By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin

On April 1, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to the Kremlin underscored both the fragility of the “peace in the Caucasus” framework and the enduring complexity of post-Soviet institutions, more than three decades after the collapse of the USSR. Armenia has long been a pillar of the evolving structures that emerged from the Commonwealth of Independent States, from economic integration—most recently through the Eurasian Economic Union—to military coordination within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

The backdrop has shifted. The war in Iran now threatens all three South Caucasus states, particularly landlocked Armenia. Against this backdrop, Mr Pashinyan and Russian president Vladimir Putin appeared jointly before the press prior to their talks—an unusual move. Their remarks followed familiar diplomatic formulas, yet the tone was notably more direct than in the past.

Zelensky Seeks Leverage as Attention Shifts Abroad

By Nina Bachkatov

On March 21, President Volodymyr Zelensky said talks between Ukrainian and American negotiators would continue for a second day, underlining the urgency of the moment. Timing has become critical. A trilateral meeting aimed at ending the war, scheduled to take place in Abu Dhabi on February 28, has been postponed indefinitely for obvious reasons. Zelensky went further, stating that he was “requiring” from Washington a “clear” timetable for the next round of negotiations with Russia.

What he described as a “political delegation” has been tasked with persuading its interlocutors, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, that Ukraine seeks peace—unlike Russia—and that it is therefore incumbent on the US to sustain diplomatic efforts.

Russia’s Quiet Calculus as Conflict Expands in the Middle East

By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin

From the first days of the war in Iran, President Vladimir Putin offered little more than formulaic statements — a response echoed by China and several members of the expanded BRICS grouping. Iran now sits in the organisation alongside Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, as well as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, themselves now threatened by Iranian drones.

The easy conclusion would be that Russia’s muted reaction reflects weakness — an inability to support an ally in Iran as it once did in Syria, Venezuela or Cuba. But the reality may be more prosaic. Iran is an ally, not a friend. Their strategic partnership contains no mutual defence clause. The bilateral trade relationship is uneven, largely favouring Iranian firms, while Russian companies face obstacles through restrictive financial clearing mechanisms. Nor does the Kremlin appear eager to take diplomatic risks by openly defending a regime dominated by hardline clerics. Moscow’s earlier proposal to defuse the crisis by offering to store Iran’s enriched uranium lost much of its relevance after Israeli and US strikes on Iranian facilities.

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