Russia’s Messaging Platforms at a Crossroads

By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin

When Russia’s communications regulator Roskomnadzor ordered restrictions on WhatsApp and Telegram calls on 13 August 2025, it marked a new escalation in the state’s long campaign to bring foreign tech platforms to heel. The move targeted Russia’s two most popular messaging services – used by 57 and 46 per cent of the population respectively – and followed weeks of speculation in Moscow’s political circles.

Authorities framed the decision as a step against online fraud, which cost individuals and businesses an estimated 169 billion roubles ($2bn) in the first eleven months of 2024. Yet, the justification appears tenuous: according to the Foundation for Public Opinion (FOM), 60 per cent of scams in Russia occur via ordinary phone calls; social media and messengers account for just 14 per cent.

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Trump and Lukashenko: an unlikely tandem

By Nina Bachkatov

Thousands of ground troops and air force units took part in Zapad 2025, the large-scale military exercise held on Russian and Belarusian training grounds between 12 and 16 September. The manoeuvres came amid heightened tensions between Moscow and the West, as Russian drones crossed into Poland and Ukraine, fuelling fears that the drills might mask preparations for an assault on Ukraine’s northern borders.

Nato had only recently carried out its own exercise focused on defending the Suwałki corridor. Meanwhile, Russia’s Pacific Fleet concluded a command-post drill with submarines and coastal systems, and Nato was preparing to launch Neptune Strike in the Baltic Sea on 22 September, involving, among other vessels, the US Navy destroyer USS Bainbridge.

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A Glut of Summits and a Lack of Substance

By Nina Bachkatov

If summits are a barometer of international relations, August and early September 2025 have been unusually busy. It began in Anchorage on 15 August, when President Trump warmly shook hands with President Putin—without extracting any concessions. The encounter alarmed President Zelensky, who rushed to Washington to set the record straight, backed by European allies keen to assert their weight and prevent another public humiliation of Ukraine’s leader by “Daddy Trump.” There were much flattery and thanks, but little substance.

After that, “historic summits” became a near-daily occurrence, often convened at short notice. There were duos, trios, quartets—an entire diplomatic orchestra—until President Macron called a “hybrid” summit in Paris on 4 September, with Zelensky in attendance. The self-styled “coalition of the  willing” wanted to present its own plan after Trump had challenged them to do so. Hybrid in format (some leaders in person, others by video), it also mixed those with authority to deploy troops with EU officials who lacked such powers. At the last minute, they were joined by Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff.

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Inflation, Jobs, and Resilience in Russia

By Nina Bachkatov

On 18 July, the European Union approved its 18th package of sanctions against Russia, expanding the list of Russian banks excluded from the SWIFT system and imposing a third round of sanctions on companies involved in trading Russian oil above the newly lowered price cap of $45 per barrel—down from $60 previously set by the G7. The objective remains unchanged since the first wave of sanctions in 2022: to deprive the Russian state budget of funds for financing the war, and to weaken the economy to the point where elites or the broader population might pressure President Vladimir Putin to end the conflict—or potentially push him from power.

Yet, the challenge has always been to strike a balance between weakening Russia and protecting the EU’s own economic stability—an issue that has never been adequately addressed. This tension partly explains the difficulties in formulating each successive sanctions package.

Nevertheless, sanctions are having an impact, a fact acknowledged increasingly by officials and even by Putin himself. Speaking at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, he dismissed claims that the war was devastating the Russian economy, famously quoting Mark Twain: “The report of my death is greatly exaggerated.” He cited continued GDP growth, low public debt and economic diversification as evidence of resilience under pressure. However, he also warned that the economy risked cooling too sharply after two years of war-driven expansion. Economy Minister Maxim Reshetnikov echoed the concern, cautioning that Russia was “teetering on the edge of recession,” while business leaders presented sobering figures from their respective sectors.

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Ukraine Grapples with War and Budgetary Strain

By Nina Bachkatov

The fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in Rome on 11 and 12 July, brought together Ukraine’s allies in yet another show of support for Kyiv. President Volodymyr Zelensky, in attendance once again, displayed his now-familiar ability to project optimism in the face of deepening adversity. His appeal focused on increased deliveries of military aid—especially air defence systems—and calls for further sanctions on Russia.

Despite these urgent pleas, the conference—comprising heads of state and government, international organisations, and business leaders—projected a united front committed to “the swift recovery and long-term reconstruction of Ukraine.” Yet such ambition stood in stark contrast to the realities on the ground: the war rages on, and even a ceasefire appears remote.

This particular gathering differed from the string of summits previously held under similar banners. Its context was more alarming: on the battlefield, Russia had launched unprecedented waves of drone and missile attacks on Kyiv and Western Ukraine—regions typically spared the worst. Though civilian casualties remained relatively low, the scale of destruction was vast, and the strain on the population has intensified.

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Middle East Angst — and More

By Nina Bachkatov

The American operation Midnight Hammer against Iran’s nuclear, military, and air defence installations has forced many external actors to abandon the discretion they adopted just a week earlier. This includes Russia and China, which issued a coordinated “firm condemnation” of the Israeli airstrikes following a phone call between Presidents Putin and Xi. Like many other world leaders, they initially hoped this would be a limited operation, lacking broader international backing, and urged a “political and diplomatic settlement”.

Their shared interests are clear: the preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a region where a nuclear-armed Iran would be destabilising; opposition to foreign-imposed regime change; and a common scepticism that any Iranian government, clerical or not, will fully abandon its military nuclear ambitions. Neither Moscow nor Beijing harbours particular sympathy for the Iranian regime, but both have vivid memories of Western-led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

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New and Old Twist of the Ukrainian War

By Nina Bachkatov

It has been described as an “asymmetric offensive,” in which Ukrainian forces—under pressure on the front line—have managed to shift the balance of power by striking deep into enemy territory. The operation showcased a combination of sophisticated technology, credible intelligence, and bold execution. It began on 31 May with a series of successful strikes on bridges and rail lines inside Russia, including some in occupied territory and at least one with civilian casualties.

The most dramatic act followed on 1 June: the so-called “Spider Web” operation, more reminiscent of a Hollywood script than a traditional military campaign. It involved simultaneous drone strikes against four military airfields located thousands of kilometres inside Russian territory, reportedly launched from within Russia itself. There were also reports of sabotage at a pillar of the Kerch Bridge, cyberattacks on a Russian strategic aviation manufacturer, and leaks of military planning. According to Ukraine’s security service (SBU), preparations for the operation had been underway for 18 months.

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