USA – INSIDE RUSSIA AND EURASIA

From Munich to Riyadh: More Than Just the Ukraine Test For E.U.

By Nina Bachkatov

A week of geopolitical upheaval has dramatically altered how Ukraine and its allies intended to mark the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The catalyst was former President Donald Trump’s blunt revelation that he had spoken for 90 minutes with Russian President Vladimir Putin—an announcement that came as a complete surprise to both Ukraine and the European Union, who were only informed after the fact. Trump’s message was unambiguous: Ukraine will not join NATO; the United States will not deploy troops but supports European nations doing so; Russia will retain control over occupied territories; and American assistance to Ukraine will be dictated by U.S. financial interests. Moreover, Washington and Moscow would hold further talks in Saudi Arabia.

Zelensky’s Diplomatic Offensive in the U.S.

By Nina Bachkatov

On 18 September, President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled a “fully prepared” Victory Plan, marking his second political gamble in as many weeks. The first was the unexpected cross-border attack on Russia’s Kursk region, which reportedly caught even senior Ukrainian officials by surprise. This 10-point Victory Plan, more radical and uncompromising than the 4-point Peace Plan presented in February, adopts a “take it or leave it” approach towards Ukraine’s allies. Its contents will be “discussed” during a meeting with President Biden on 26 September, the focal point of Zelensky’s five-day tour of the United States.

Lucerne: Zelensky’s diplomatic challenge

By Nina Bachkatov

A “Peace Summit” in Ukraine will be held in Switzerland on June 15-16, following a request made by President Zelensky in January. The Ukrainian president expects participants to discuss the 10-point peace plan he presented to President Biden in December 2022, and subsequently to the G7, G20, and other international organisations, when the military situation was more favorable. Now, with the expectation that the war might extend to 2025 or beyond, this meeting poses a significant diplomatic challenge for Zelensky. He envisions a global pro-Ukrainian, anti-Russian bloc, including not only Western allies but also states that have so far maintained an ambiguous neutrality.

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A NATO Summit Confronting the Future of European Security

By Nina Bachkatov

Tensions have been steadily escalating in the lead-up to the NATO summit in Vilnius on 11-12 July. While both Washington and Brussels share the common objective of securing the European continent, which now includes Ukraine, and safeguarding the democratic world, they differ in their diplomatic, political, and financial approaches to achieve these goals. Furthermore, their perspectives diverge on China, a country positioning itself as the primary beneficiary of the deteriorating relations between EU institutions, European capitals, and Russia due to the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. This apprehensive climate has led to nuanced expressions through official statements, orchestrated leaks, and interviews. There is a concern that the outcomes of the summit will leave everyone dissatisfied.

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Pages: 12

Zelensky’s Diplomatic Gamble: Seeking Support in a Divided World

By Nina Bachkatov

On May 26th, Mikhailo Podolzhak, a trusted aide to President Zelensky, stated during an interview with an Italian channel that the Ukrainian counter-offensive “has been underway for several days”. This statement supported the speculation that a summer counter-offensive had replaced the much-anticipated “spring counter-offensive.” The Ukrainian offensive began in early May with heavy shelling targeting Russian defense lines, border villages, and even infrastructures deeper into Russian territory. During this period, both sides engaged in an unprecedented use of drones, with reports of thousands of drones being deployed. These drones varied in size and sophistication, ranging from small, unsophisticated devices to more advanced ones. The drones not only inflicted casualties but also created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.

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Pages: 12

Still Waiting for the Ukrainian Counter-offensive

By Nina Bachkatov

For weeks, the late spring Ukrainian counter-offensive has the object of intense speculation as it has been in late September, when the fall of Kherson seemed to pave the way for a roll back of Russian troops. But the situation is different today. During the winter, the West has responded to president Zelensky’s requests for the delivery of sophisticated offensive and defensive weaponry, and trained thousands of Ukrainian soldiers to man them. In those conditions, Ukrainian forces should be able to succeed in a counter-offensive, providing their country with a strong position at the negotiation table. In the meantime, the West has been scouting the world, to find ammunitions compatible with Ukrainian guns, sometimes bidding against each other or using dubious intermediaries. The Ukrainian forces consume ammunitions in huge quantities, which means more of it before and after the counter-offensive’s start.

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Crimea: the End of a Taboo

By Nina Bachkatov

The taboo concerning the fate of Crimea had just started to crumble, when the incident of 15 March involving a Russian fighter plane and an American unmanned drone put the Black Sea region under renewed international scrutiny – a region involving Ukrainian southern ports and the peninsula that Ukrainian forces want to regain. It was the first direct confrontation between two countries, Russia and the U.S., that are not technically at war which each other, but are actively involved on the dividing line about the European continent’s security. This kind of incident was due to happen in a region where Russians and the “allies of Ukraine” are testing the reactivity of each other in international airspace (or waters). In this case, the test concerned so-called “restricted zones”, unilaterally announced by Moscow in the framework of its invasion, extending Russian rights to occupied Ukrainian territories in 2014 and 2022.

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Pages: 12