By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin
On April 1, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to the Kremlin underscored both the fragility of the “peace in the Caucasus” framework and the enduring complexity of post-Soviet institutions, more than three decades after the collapse of the USSR. Armenia has long been a pillar of the evolving structures that emerged from the Commonwealth of Independent States, from economic integration—most recently through the Eurasian Economic Union—to military coordination within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
The backdrop has shifted. The war in Iran now threatens all three South Caucasus states, particularly landlocked Armenia. Against this backdrop, Mr Pashinyan and Russian president Vladimir Putin appeared jointly before the press prior to their talks—an unusual move. Their remarks followed familiar diplomatic formulas, yet the tone was notably more direct than in the past.
The era of deferential rhetoric from post-Soviet leaders appears to be fading. Public exchanges now include expressions of frustration, assertions of national interest and, at times, open disagreement. Putin, while more patient than in his dealings with Western counterparts, appears to recognise the domestic pressures facing his counterparts, who must demonstrate resolve to their electorates. Russian commentators have noted, with some irony, that leaders from the former Soviet space are among the few who speak candidly to the Kremlin.
A more flexible diplomacy
These more forthright exchanges reflect an evolution in Russian diplomatic practice. Moscow has broadened its negotiating toolkit, at times deploying unofficial interlocutors such as Kirill Dmitriev in discussions with Washington over Ukraine. A calibrated “good cop, bad cop” approach has also emerged, reinforcing Putin’s image as both a defender of Russian interests and a figure above day-to-day disputes, particularly within the post-Soviet sphere.
In the days surrounding the visit, tensions were amplified by remarks from Armenian parliamentary speaker Alen Simonyan, member of the same party than Pashinian, and Russian deputy prime minister Alexei Overchuk. Simonyan suggested that Armenia could reconsider its membership of both the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union if Russia were to raise gas prices, tapping into domestic resentment over Moscow’s perceived passivity during Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Overchuk, by contrast, warned of the economic costs of closer alignment with the EU, including potential disruption to trade and even air links. His comments went beyond Putin’s more measured line, which emphasised that while Russia remained “calm” about Armenia’s European ambitions, simultaneous membership of both blocs would be “impossible”. Amazingly, the language echoed that used by former European Commission president José Manuel Barroso during Ukraine’s pivotal November 2013 negotiations—an episode that ultimately contributed to the fall of Viktor Yanukovych.
Pashinyan’s domestic gamble
Mr Pashinyan’s visit carried symbolic weight. His choice to wear a pin depicting Armenia’s internationally recognised borders— in which Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijan territory—was widely interpreted as a signal of his current political stance. At home, he faces mounting criticism over what many Armenians see as a series of concessions, including the displacement of some 120,000 ethnic Armenians from the region; the August 2025 peace declaration with Azerbaijan; the redrawing of the Constitution to remove inclusion of the 1990 Declaration of Independence stating that Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia. The new text has to be approved before the parliamentary elections on 7 June.
Pashinian has just to look at Georgia and Azerbaijan experience to see the danger of political parties representing the grievance of veterans and refugees from lost secessionist regions. As their leaders did, and still do, the Armenian prime minister has framed the upcoming election as a choice between peace and renewed conflict. His Civil Contract party leads at 25% in polling but is unlikely to secure a parliamentary majority in which case Pashinian may keep his premiership. Continued cooperation with Russia remains, for now, the most pragmatic course, given Armenia’s geographic constraints and dependence on external trade routes.
Yet public anger is palpable. Witness the 29 March picture of a man spitting towards his car because “the Turk (Pashinyan) sold our lands” to Azerbaijan.
Russia recalibrates
For Putin, the Washington-brokered agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan marked a diplomatic setback after years of Russian mediation. Moscow has been wary of efforts to portray the deal as diminishing Russian and Iranian influence in favour of the US.
Even so, Russia has moved to consolidate its position through economic and infrastructure links. A newly launched rail transit route via Azerbaijan allows Armenia to import—and soon export—goods to Russia by rail, reinforcing ties within the Eurasian Economic Union. Infrastructure projects, including transport corridors and energy cooperation, have become central to Moscow’s regional strategy.
Analysts, including Vadim Dubnov in NovayaGazeta.ru, highlight the growing importance of connectivity initiatives such as the proposed Zangezur corridor for gas transport; the renewal of Armenia railways concession at the end of the contract; the construction of a new nuclear power station that Trump is eying; and competing international investment plans. These projects underscore the region’s shifting geopolitical balance, as Armenia explores alternative partnerships while seeking to maintain its traditional ties.
Pashinyan has acknowledged the structural incompatibility of EU and Eurasian integration. Yet he insists that, for now, Armenia will continue to pursue a pragmatic balance—so long as room for manoeuvre remains.