By Nina Bachkatov and Romain Constantin
From the first days of the war in Iran, President Vladimir Putin offered little more than formulaic statements — a response echoed by China and several members of the expanded BRICS grouping. Iran now sits in the organisation alongside Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, as well as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, themselves now threatened by Iranian drones.
The easy conclusion would be that Russia’s muted reaction reflects weakness — an inability to support an ally in Iran as it once did in Syria, Venezuela or Cuba. But the reality may be more prosaic. Iran is an ally, not a friend. Their strategic partnership contains no mutual defence clause. The bilateral trade relationship is uneven, largely favouring Iranian firms, while Russian companies face obstacles through restrictive financial clearing mechanisms. Nor does the Kremlin appear eager to take diplomatic risks by openly defending a regime dominated by hardline clerics. Moscow’s earlier proposal to defuse the crisis by offering to store Iran’s enriched uranium lost much of its relevance after Israeli and US strikes on Iranian facilities.
A week after the first attacks, Russia’s main hope is simply that the military operations do not escalate into a wider war. Its worst scenario — what Russian diplomats describe as the “Balkanisation” of the region — would bring prolonged instability across the Middle East. Yet Moscow also sees potential advantages.
Russia’s unexpected dividends
Politically, Russia views with satisfaction the widening strains within the transatlantic alliance. Differences between the European Commission and several national governments have become more visible as European capitals assess the conflict through the lens of their own national interests.
Economically, Russia stands to benefit immediately from rising energy prices. The opposite is true for the EU, whose competitiveness and export performance remain closely tied to energy costs. Shipping patterns have already begun to shift: tankers have altered routes mid-voyage to head towards South Asian markets willing to pay higher prices. Meanwhile Donald Trump suspended restrictions on Indian purchases and allowed a tanker seized in Venezuela to continue its voyage to India.
While global energy markets may absorb the shock to some extent, the situation is more precarious for critical commodities such as fertilisers and certain minerals. Production facilities have been damaged and export shipments disrupted, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz. Russia remains a major producer, though constrained by western sanctions that could come under pressure if shortages intensify.
The Kremlin is also watching anxieties in Washington and Europe that Arab states could be forced to scale back foreign investments as their reconstruction costs mount. The White House has already expressed concern over sovereign wealth funds from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, which have pledged hundreds of billions of dollars in investments in the US and have significant holdings across the UK and the EU.
Zelensky’s balancing act
Ukraine immediately recognised the risk of being pushed down the international agenda, even as European leaders reiterated their support. President Volodymyr Zelensky also observed how Europe appeared divided and largely absent in the immediate aftermath of Israeli and US strikes. The only European leader reportedly informed by Donald Trump at the last minute was UK prime minister Keir Starmer — whom Trump later derided as “not a Churchill” during a tense Oval Office meeting with Germany’s chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Ukraine nevertheless needs to keep both Washington and Europe engaged. Kyiv’s response has been to highlight its battlefield expertise. In a national address on March 4, Zelensky noted that the US and other countries were turning to Ukraine for help in countering Iranian-made Shahed drones. Ukrainian officials, he said, had been “communicating very actively” with representatives from Gulf states. In return, Kyiv hopes western partners will provide additional air-defence systems. Ukrainian assistance abroad, Zelensky suggested, would also strengthen Kyiv’s diplomatic position.
At the same time, Ukraine has become entangled in complex European politics. Zelensky rejected a request from an EU inspection team to examine damage to the Druzhba pipeline, which carries Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia. If the pipeline had reopened quickly, Brussels had considered easing certain energy restrictions in exchange for Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s support for a €90bn aid package for Ukraine. Instead, Zelensky portrayed the EU as capitulating to Orbán’s pressure.
Then Hungarian authorities detained seven couriers crossing the border with 45 million euros in cash and gold in a vehicle belonging to Ukraine’s state-owned Oschadbank. The men were released but the funds seized on suspicion of money laundering. Kyiv insisted the method had long been used to repatriate cash and called the operation “state terrorism and racketing”. Following a call with Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni — now increasingly influential in EU political debates — Zelensky concluded that “Europe needs more coordination, more mutual support and more of its own strength”.
Next round of talks
In March 5–6, Russia and Ukraine exchanged 500 prisoners of war under the terms of the Geneva conventions — a rare sign of continued communication. But the expansion of conflict from Iran towards the wider Gulf raises questions about where and how new negotiations on Ukraine might take place. Oman, previously considered a neutral venue, now appears less secure. The US is preoccupied with the Middle East, while Kyiv may prefer to wait until spring to consolidate its military position.
For Moscow, patience is a viable strategy. Russian officials are watching to see who ultimately emerges from the Gulf confrontation — and how deeply it affects the West. Even in Syria, Russia eventually managed to negotiate a minimal transition arrangement with the post-Assad leadership. Today, however, the Kremlin’s main concern is the absence of a clear US political strategy once Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities have been degraded. Another worry is that Israel and the US could pursue separate, uncoordinated wars.
For now, Putin sees more opportunity than risk. He recently criticised what he called the EU’s “misguided” sanctions policy and its contradictory plans to eliminate Russian energy imports by 2026 or 2027. Such uncertainty, he argued, complicates planning for Russian companies. Given the emergence of higher-priced alternative markets, Putin suggested Moscow might be better off reducing supplies to Europe sooner rather than later and consolidating its position elsewhere.
The Kremlin also sees potential diplomatic openings in any negotiations to resolve the Iranian crisis and broader regional conflict — talks the UN has already called for. China has been lobbying for a ceasefire under UN auspices. Russian analysts argue that Moscow occupies a “unique position”: it maintains communication channels — and a degree of trust — with all sides of the conflict. That, they believe, could ultimately make Russia an indispensable mediator.