By Nina Bachkatov
There was little to expect from the trilateral summit in Geneva beyond the fact that it took place and ended without drama. Ukraine and Russia described the meeting as “difficult” — diplomatic shorthand for an inability to move forward on the two recurring obstacles: security guarantees and territorial questions. Still, Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Rustem Umerov, and later President Volodymyr Zelensky, hinted at possible progress on the concept of a demilitarised zone. The devil will be in the detail, but at least the discussion is inching forward.
Both sides travelled to Geneva largely to signal goodwill about ending the war. Above all, however, they are anxious to keep President Donald Trump engaged — as are NATO and individual European governments. They fear that the multiplicity of crises, some of his own making, could distract Trump from Ukraine in particular and Europe more broadly.
At the same moment, in the same city, an American delegation was meeting Iranian officials to discuss Tehran’s nuclear programme. A third of the US Navy was deployed in the Gulf, while pundits debated whether Trump was prepared to use force or merely to intimidate. The Middle East lies at the heart of American strategic interests, as do China and the “western hemisphere”, from South America to Greenland.
The Trump factor
For Trump, Ukraine is peripheral. He has expressed exasperation at what he sees as the obstinacy of President Zelensky, the intransigence of President Vladimir Putin, and the stance of Europeans whom he believes encourage Kyiv to prolong the war.
Zelensky is attempting to balance American and European support, alternating gratitude with reproach. He does not believe meaningful security guarantees are possible outside NATO — which in practice still means Washington’s backing. Putin, for his part, adheres to his narrative of Russia defending itself against a western plot that threatens its security and its status as a great power alongside the US and China. The NATO secretary-general is striving to convince Trump that Europeans will increase defence spending, while warning European allies against the illusion that they could soon go it alone.
The principal obstacle to a peace settlement — or even a ceasefire, whatever one chooses to call a pause in four years of destruction — is that both Zelensky and Putin believe their armed forces can compel the other to negotiate from a weakened position. That implies continued fighting through the spring, perhaps until mid-June, a date mentioned by Zelensky in early February. Recently, Ukrainian officials have emphasised the strains on Russia’s front lines and economy.
Economic strain, political resolve
President Putin has acknowledged more than once that the war is weighing on the Russian economy. Ministers, federal agencies and business leaders have spoken openly of difficulties in their sectors. In a tightly controlled system, however, such admissions can scarcely be seen as transparency. Rather, they appear designed to rally the population behind its leadership and to prepare it for further sacrifice on the grounds that the alternative would be national defeat.
In a perverse way, Ukrainian drone strikes — as well as missile attacks using weapons supplied by European partners — reinforce the Kremlin’s narrative that the West is seeking to use what it calls the “illegitimate” or even “Nazi” government in Kyiv to weaken Russia. Hence the insistence on endurance and minimal concessions.
On the Ukrainian side, Zelensky continues to believe that European backing will endure, though not without American support. Domestically, he faces a delicate transitional position. Deprived of the protective role long played by Andriy Yermak, he finds himself acting more directly as arbiter between newcomers in government and the presidential administration, each consolidating their authority.
The new defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, a 34-year-old former high-tech entrepreneur, has described his new circle of advisers as figures “with authority and firmly pro-Ukrainian stances”. He has floated the idea of a “militarisation bonus” to encourage mobilisation and the recruitment of prisoners.
Waiting for a spring offensive
This is the context in which Kyiv hopes that its Armed Forces, bolstered by renewed western assistance, can mount an effective spring counter-offensive at a time when Russian advances appear to be slowing. The forces have been restructured, with greater emphasis on digital warfare and the creation of 12 new corps, each assigned a specific zone of responsibility and designed for more flexible redeployment.
While wide operational autonomy for commanders has long been considered an asset, the current focus is on reinforcing units operating from eastern Zaporizhzhya in an effort to draw Russian troops away from the Donbas and from buffer zones in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, where Moscow’s offensive has been largely successful. This requires tighter planning and coordination. The message from Kyiv is that the military command will not accept a ceasefire imposed prematurely.
Unlike Zelensky, Putin does not rely on foreign aid and loans that could constrain future economic independence. Russia’s economy has suffered and has paid a price for circumventing sanctions and discounting its energy exports. Yet there is little indication that he is prepared to end the war, unless minimal concessions can please Trump. Instead, he waits — a stance reflected in the evasive remarks of Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, who alternates between saying there are “no clear indications” and that he has “heard something without confirmation”.
War and peace, in parallel
Neither side appears ready to accept an unconditional ceasefire, and both refuse to commit to a clear timetable. Instead, Russians have preceded a new round of talks with intensified attacks on Ukrainian energy and rail infrastructure. Ukrainian forces have responded with renewed waves of drone strikes, depriving half the residents of Bryansk of heating, as they did earlier in Belgorod. They continue to target Russian export infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, including in Crimea and the Krasnodar region.
This pattern may persist for months, unless a dramatic blunder forces a halt to military operations or an unexpected diplomatic initiative gains traction. In the meantime, as in past conflicts, negotiations and military action are likely to proceed in parallel rather than in sequence.
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