By Nina Bachkatov
The recent meeting between President Trump and President Xi was expected, in some quarters, to mark the moment when Washington would pressure Beijing to in turn pressure Moscow into accepting a “just peace” in Ukraine. Instead, it highlighted the limits of that expectation. The two leaders announced only that they would “do something together” on Ukraine. There was no mention of secondary sanctions should China continue to support Russia’s war effort. Taiwan, the other major strategic question in the room, was left untouched.
The encounter was consistent with the broader pattern of Trump’s tour of South and South-East Asia during the ASEAN summit in Malaysia. Trade dominated every bilateral exchange. Trump arrived buoyed by what he characterised as diplomatic success in the Middle East and presided over a symbolic peace agreement between Thailand and Cambodia. He authorised South Korea to build a nuclear submarine. Leaders offered concessions and investment as the price of tariff relief from Washington. Market openings and headline investment pledges into the US replaced any notion of a rules-based trading order.
In this context, Xi was treated by Trump as a peer, alongside “my friend Vladimir.” Their meeting resulted in a one-year bilateral trade arrangement that combined tariff flexibility, promises on access to rare earths, and selected market openings. Trump rated the talks as “12 out of 10.” Xi appeared unmoved by the theatrics, even after Trump declared—just hours before the meeting—that he had ordered the resumption of US nuclear testing in response to Russia’s announcement of a new long-range nuclear-propelled missile. Beijing, already accelerating its military modernisation, simply noted the signal and continued.
Business first
For Europe, the tour provides a clear template for understanding Trump’s foreign policy doctrine. First, meaningful action in global conflicts depends on political, military and financial backing from Washington. Second, the degree of US engagement depends primarily on its commercial interests. Third, negotiations are framed through tariff pressure, applied individually and continuously. Fourth, US strategy has drifted toward isolationism, but on a distinctly mercantilist basis. Finally, American security guarantees will be linked to increased European defence spending and the purchase of American equipment—enabling a reduction in US military deployments abroad, including on NATO’s eastern flank.
This context matters because, more than anything, Ukraine’s war now pivots on money. The conflict has lasted longer than allies anticipated, and the cost of sustaining Ukrainian capabilities has risen sharply. Kyiv’s finances are projected to run critically low by March. While Trump was downplaying Ukraine in order to secure progress with Xi, the European Commission was attempting to devise a funding mechanism to demonstrate its commitment to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.”
EU funds
Ursula von der Leyen returned with a proposal to use €175bn in frozen Russian central bank assets to finance Ukrainian defence through a so-called Reparation Loan, to be repaid by Ukraine once Russia pays war damages. Euroclear, which holds €140bn of these funds, would be the first channel. Belgium’s government objected: it does not wish to bear the legal and geopolitical fallout alone. The Kremlin already announced retorsions. The Belgian prime minister has demanded a collective guarantee from all 27 EU members, as well as transparency regarding the remaining €35bn held elsewhere. Several states question both the legal framing and the potential implications for the euro’s reliability as a reserve currency. As a result, no agreement was reached at the 23–24 October summit, and the issue has been deferred to December European Council.
Meanwhile, the three central figures in this diplomatic triangle—Trump, Putin and Zelensky—are each playing for time, but with different expectations. Trump is impatient to secure a deal that can be presented domestically as decisive. His interest in Ukraine is secondary to a global tariff contest he sees as more strategically significant. He has grown frustrated with Putin, but his stance remains transactional. His personal dislike of Zelensky complicates the dynamic further.
Putin, for his part, maintains his belief that Russia can prevail or at least dictate political outcomes by force and persistence. Recent territorial gains around Pokrovsk may give him leverage in any negotiation over the Donbas. He continues to combine nuclear signalling with selective economic overtures, including sending to Washington his special envoy for investments and economic cooperation envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Interviewed by CNN, he refused question about the military situation (“I am not a military expert”) and projected a tone of technocratic normalcy. The message is clear: Russia is open for business—on its terms.
Timing is all
Zelensky also believes time is on Ukraine’s side. After a planned White House meeting was disrupted by a phone call between Putin and Trump, he moved quickly to secure renewed commitments from European states and the broader coalition supporting Ukraine. Kyiv’s drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, combined with hopes for further Western funding and weapons, are intended to force Moscow to the negotiating table from a position of weakness.
Yet the risks of overconfidence are considerable. Zelensky has told Ukrainians that European support could allow fighting to continue for three or four more years. But the funds are not yet secured; recruitment challenges persist; frontline conditions are deteriorating; and a harsh winter could prompt a new refugee wave that would test political support in Germany and Poland.
Putin remains convinced that endurance will favour Russia. Zelensky believes Western backing will hold. Trump wants a deal he can claim as victory. Between these positions lies the central uncertainty: whether Ukraine’s allies can mobilise financial and political support at the scale and speed required.
Time is now a strategic actor in the war. And it is not neutral.