By Nina Bachkatov
Thousands of ground troops and air force units took part in Zapad 2025, the large-scale military exercise held on Russian and Belarusian training grounds between 12 and 16 September. The manoeuvres came amid heightened tensions between Moscow and the West, as Russian drones crossed into Poland and Ukraine, fuelling fears that the drills might mask preparations for an assault on Ukraine’s northern borders.
Nato had only recently carried out its own exercise focused on defending the Suwałki corridor. Meanwhile, Russia’s Pacific Fleet concluded a command-post drill with submarines and coastal systems, and Nato was preparing to launch Neptune Strike in the Baltic Sea on 22 September, involving, among other vessels, the US Navy destroyer USS Bainbridge.
Although 23 states sent observers to Zapad 2025, the cameras lingered on two Americans in uniform chatting amiably with Belarusian officials. One was identified as the US military attaché, thanking Belarus defence minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin for his invitation. Khrenin replied that he had instructed his ministry to show the US delegation “absolutely everything they are interested in”. Belarusian media coverage was effusive, Russian outlets more measured, while Western reporting leaned towards speculation.
A blurred message
The episode inevitably revived questions about Donald Trump’s intentions. Some diplomats downplayed the symbolism, noting that OSCE rules provide for automatic observation of such exercises. Others saw significance in the fact that the Americans were received not by the chief of the general staff but by the defence minister himself, in full uniform. Few were willing to suggest that Alexander Lukashenko had arranged the encounter behind Vladimir Putin’s back. The more convenient conclusion was that all three men — Trump, Lukashenko and Putin — were pursuing their own interests in “rebooting” Minsk–Washington relations.
Signs of a shift in Washington’s posture had emerged even before the exercise. In June, President Trump dispatched his envoy Keith Kellogg to Minsk. Belarusian officials were left disappointed, complaining that they had “taken risks in opening to the US” without receiving anything tangible in return. A subsequent series of discreet American visits reinforced the message that Minsk would have to make concessions, while also allowing Belarus to frame any thaw as the result of Trump’s personal initiative.
The most eye-catching development came on 14 September, when Trump’s presidential envoy John Coale spent five hours with Lukashenko. The talks led to the US lifting sanctions on Belarus’s flag carrier Belavia and, eventually, on potash exports. In exchange, Lukashenko released 52 political prisoners.
Putin’s gains
Throughout, Lukashenko was careful to stress that contacts with Washington would end immediately if the US sought to drive a wedge between Belarus and Russia, that posture gave Putin reason to welcome the opening. The presence of an American military attaché at Zapad 2025 signalled that the Belarus–Russia Union now encompassed a military dimension not foreseen at its inception — on Nato’s borders and Ukraine’s flank.
Economically, the easing of sanctions on Belarus benefits Russia, given the Union’s common market. If Belavia regains access to Boeing spare parts, those could potentially serve Russia’s own fleet, which is suffering severe shortages. Similar logic applies in other sectors where American business interests overlap. Pressure for easing restrictions also comes from unexpected quarters: UN secretary-general António Guterres has urged a relaxation of sanctions on Belarusian potash, citing food security needs in the Global South.
For Putin, the priority is to highlight areas of alignment with Trump, projecting shared global interests that transcend the “regional war launched by Zelensky and Biden” now “fuelled by the EU”. In this shared narrative, Russian officials are well aware of Trump’s unpredictability, but determined to extract maximum advantage when possible and prepare for the worst. Hence Putin’s declaration on 22 September, on the eve of the UN General Assembly, that Moscow was ready to continue observing “the main restrictions” of the START treaty after its scheduled expiry in February 2026, and later pending a review of the situation.
Risky internationalisation
After more than three years of war in Ukraine, with no resolution in sight, Kyiv’s allies are showing signs of fatigue. The EU is struggling to meet its financial commitments, particularly if called on to replace US support. President Volodymyr Zelensky has intensified warnings that Russia is a global security threat, requiring a broad international response. While this resonates in Western capitals, his appeal fell flat at the UN General Assembly, where debates were dominated by recognition of Palestine and the fallout from natural disasters.
The temptation to internationalise the conflict reflects Zelensky’s fear of being abandoned by wavering European partners. Yet the same strategy may also appeal to Putin — and even to Trump — since a proliferation of actors, each pursuing divergent goals, generates the ambiguity in which “great powers” thrive.
The Chinese dimension further complicates matters. On 9 September, as Poland closed its border with Belarus ahead of the exercise, Lukashenko denounced the move as an “unfriendly step” towards … Beijing. The remark was later seized upon by the Polish opposition, business groups and think-tanks in the run-up to a visit by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to both Poland and Belarus. Critics warned that Prime Minister Donald Tusk risked turning the region into a flashpoint in a new Cold War and threatening strategic trade corridors.
The concern is not abstract. Poland sits astride the main rail arteries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative into Europe, with the Małaszewicze terminal functioning as a key transshipment hub. Any disruption to this route would raise costs for Chinese exporters and disrupt European supply chains.
This is the moment Ukraine choose to denounce the presence, for the third time since June, of a Chinese container ship in Sebastopol. And president Zelensky announced that a Israeli Patriot system was in use for a month already.