By Nina Bachkatov
The American operation Midnight Hammer against Iran’s nuclear, military, and air defence installations has forced many external actors to abandon the discretion they adopted just a week earlier. This includes Russia and China, which issued a coordinated “firm condemnation” of the Israeli airstrikes following a phone call between Presidents Putin and Xi. Like many other world leaders, they initially hoped this would be a limited operation, lacking broader international backing, and urged a “political and diplomatic settlement”.
Their shared interests are clear: the preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a region where a nuclear-armed Iran would be destabilising; opposition to foreign-imposed regime change; and a common scepticism that any Iranian government, clerical or not, will fully abandon its military nuclear ambitions. Neither Moscow nor Beijing harbours particular sympathy for the Iranian regime, but both have vivid memories of Western-led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
Larger picture
Crucially, they see the conflict as larger than the immediate devastation in Gaza, Israel, or Iran. For Russia, in particular, the stakes are high. In April, Moscow signed a Strategic Partnership with Tehran. As Putin noted on 18 June, the agreement “contains no clauses pertaining to defence cooperation… and our Iranian friends have not made such requests of us.” On past arms deals, he said: “Yes, we conducted such transactions at the time. They bear no relation to the current crisis and were within the scope of routine military-technical cooperation under international regulations.” On 11 June, his spokesperson added that “Russia is in constant contact with Iran” and “stands ready to assist with the removal of excess nuclear fuel”—a topic reportedly discussed during a previous Putin-Trump exchange.
China, for its part, is primarily concerned with safeguarding its economic and energy interests in the region. Its access to Middle Eastern markets and energy flows is paramount. Both China and Russia are linked to Iran through BRICS, which Iran joined on 1 January 2024 alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE (Saudi Arabia postponed its membership). The bloc appeals to emerging economies seeking to counterbalance Western-led global institutions. For Iran, BRICS represented an opportunity to ease the pressure of Western sanctions.
Yet BRICS cooperation does not extend to defence or security issues. Still, the war in Ukraine has left its mark. Iranian drone deliveries offered Moscow a strategic reprieve on the Ukrainian front; in turn, Israel has supplied Kyiv with intelligence and weaponry. Notably, recent Ukrainian operations behind Russian lines bear a striking resemblance to Israel’s precision strikes against Iranian leadership and military infrastructure: both were technologically sophisticated, well-planned, and heavily reliant on human intelligence. The head of Ukraine’s SBU has even earned the nickname “the Ukrainian Mossad”.
Turn to Diplomacy
Many allies quietly praised Washington for executing what German Chancellor Friedrich Merz undiplomatically called “the dirty work”. But that sentiment could shift dramatically if Israel pushes for regime change, or if Iran targets US assets in the Gulf, or attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Chinese diplomacy will likely remain muted, possibly stepping forward as a mediator at a later stage. But for Russia, proximity raises the stakes. The Kremlin may have initially viewed the Gaza-Iran-Israel quagmire as a welcome distraction from Ukraine—especially ahead of the NATO summit on countering the “Russian threat”. Yet Moscow is keenly aware that, across the Middle East, Israel is far less popular than Iran.
By advocating diplomacy, Russia brings more than rhetoric to the table. Its longstanding relationships across the region—built on discretion and pragmatism rather than rigid binaries—lend it credibility. On Iran, Russia has consistently affirmed Tehran’s right to civilian nuclear energy and remained sceptical of Israeli claims that Iran was weeks away from developing nuclear weapons. Moscow’s interests are also strategic: its Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran has so far been spared from Israeli or US strikes.
It remains uncertain whether Moscow seeks to link Middle Eastern and Ukrainian negotiations into a broader diplomatic package—possibly one that would benefit Donald Trump “peace-maker” dreams. While Russia is treading carefully on Ukraine, it operates on firmer ground when it comes to Iran. Many Russian analysts argue that, if forced to choose, Washington would prioritise arming Israel over Ukraine. Putin remains in dialogue with both Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump. Both, notably, have referred to European leaders as “obstructionists”.
Chaos and Contamination
Russia’s influence is also being tested by calls from CIS countries for “de-escalation” and diplomacy. Some, such as Kazakhstan—which hosted a first-ever Israeli-Kazakh regional forum in April—seek to preserve ties with Israel. Others, including Azerbaijan and Turkey, have condemned Israeli actions. All fear the spread of terrorism fueled by the devastation in Gaza and now Iran, perceived to be inflicted by a “Western-backed Israel”.
Geography shapes perceptions. China is focused on securing energy supplies—some 20% of its needs come from the Middle East. Russia sees a potential war on its doorstep, with the dual risk of internal unrest in Iran (a country of 92 million) and the cross-border spillover of ethnic or sectarian violence. The Baluch people, for instance, are spread across Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and have a history of insurgency. Similar concerns apply to the Azeris and the Kurds.
Thus far, regional countries have cautiously accepted Iranian refugees, assuming their stay will be temporary. Caspian-border states have facilitated the evacuation of foreign nationals stranded in Iran. But more dangerous narratives are emerging. Ankara claims Israel’s ultimate goal is to use its war with Iran to empower Kurdish groups, thereby committing “genocide against Turks” to establish a Kurdish state in Iran’s Azerbaijani-populated north—an area referred to by Azerbaijanis as “South Azerbaijan”.
This rhetoric has echoes in Armenia, where the first wave of refugees—mostly Azerbaijani-speaking—have crossed into the southern Syunik region. Yerevan fears their presence could serve as a pretext for a Baku incursion. Armenia, supported economically by Iran is more concerned about supply disruptions than refugee flows. Nevertheless, on 13 June, Yerevan had joined Ankara and Baku in condemning Israeli military action against Iran.
Amidst the geopolitical fog, some stories stand out for their surreal calm: among those granted safe passage through the Caucasus and Caspian corridor were 51 members of the Russian Tchaikovsky Symphony Orchestra and nearly 90 actors and cultural delegates, all returning from a Week of Russian Culture in Iran, which had opened—almost inconceivably—on 10 June.